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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to understand whether interjurisdictional property rights 
discrimination may be an impetus for civil war.  I begin with an overview of literature on 
property rights, property rights regimes, and property rights discrimination.  I then discuss 
the concepts of interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional property rights discrimination.  I 
suggest my theory that interjurisdictional property rights regime discrimination creates costs 
for discrimination losers from other jurisdictions.  These costs affect expectations regarding 
relative gains, which may lead to discontent and transjurisdictional political violence.   
For empirical analysis, I analyze the jurisdictionally bifurcated property rights regime 
regarding slavery that existed between free and slave states in antebellum America.  I assess 
the importance of the labor resource (slaves) to the Southern economy, the nature and costs 
of the jurisdictionally bifurcated property rights regime that developed regarding property 
rights in that resource, and how conflict over property rights in slaves spilled into secession 
and civil war.  I conclude by drawing together the main points and the mechanism by which 
interjurisdictional property rights discrimination may serve as an impetus for civil war. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON PROPERTY RIGHTS 
2.1 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Property rights in some resource means that one has the right to gain from, exclude others 
from, and exchange the resource.  Property rights are sometimes referred to as a “bundle of 
sticks” in that owners have a handful of rights regarding the use of the resource (Anderson 
and McChesney 2003, 1).  
 Property rights regimes, which consist of the “implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” 
concerning issues of property ownership, govern property rights over resources (Krasner 
1982, 186).  Such regimes take up the governance tasks of providing “a mechanism for 
assigning to particular individuals the authority to choose how specific resources will be 
employed, given a class of permissible uses.  In particular (they) specify the rights that 
individuals may hold to the use and transferability of resources (including themselves) and 
the services they yield.  The resulting system of property rights determines, via actual or 
imputed prices, how the benefits and harms flowing from a decision are allocated between 
the decision maker and other individuals.  Thus, it determines the expectations that 
individuals can form in their dealings with others (Alessi 2003, 90).” 
 Property rights regimes are defined and enforced formally (publicly) by the state as 
well as informally (privately) through social norms.  The state does not get involved in every 
issue of property rights, and does not always literally define a person’s ownership – social 
norms, or conventions, play an important role.  Rather the state acts as a 3rd party source of 
definition and enforcement of rights.  People rely on conventions for their transactions in 
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stable and strong property rights regimes, but know that they have recourse through political 
institutions to settle disputes – their property rights are well defined and enforced by the 
state.  Individuals must protect their property, for the loss of property incurs costs, but the 
individual’s “burden is inversely related to how well the state and society define and defend 
the rights (Eggertsson 2003, 75).” 
2.2 COASE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The pricing system is an important aspect of whether and how property rights are defined and 
enforced.  Coase demonstrated this point with his example of a farmer whose land is adjacent 
to a cattle-raiser.  Sometimes the cattle-raiser’s cattle stray onto the farmer’s land and destroy 
some of his crops, costing the farmer income.  The farmer has a choice to build a fence or to 
live with cattle straying onto his land and destroying his crops.  If the cost of building the 
fence is greater than the cost of allowing cattle to occasionally stray onto his land, then it is 
not economical to build the fence.  But, the farmer might also find that the situation could be 
resolved if he persuaded the cattle-owner to make a payment to him in exchange for either 
not cultivating the land that the cattle damaged or as compensation for the damaged crops.  
Coase states, “…if the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused and the pricing system works 
smoothly, the reduction in the value of production elsewhere will be taken into account 
(Coase 1960, 5).”  In the absence of transaction costs, the farmer’s production will be 
reduced and he will be compensated sufficiently for the lost production at a rate slightly 
above the price of the farmer’s optimal level of the utilization of the land.  Coase 
summarizes, “whether the cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or he 
rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount slightly greater than the farmer would pay 
(if the farmer was himself renting the land), the final result would be the same and would 
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maximize the value of production (Coase 1960, 6).”  If the pricing system works without 
cost, the “ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of the 
legal position.”  
 Coase’s argument emphasizes the importance of transaction costs in the bargaining 
process.  The solution to the problem of the use of the farmer’s land could be decided in a 
smooth pricing system (zero transaction costs) by whether the cattle-raiser’s straying cattle 
adds more to the cattle-raiser’s income than it subtracts from the farmer’s (Coase 1960, 9).  If 
the continued cultivation of the land by the farmer would cause the cattle-raiser’s income to 
fall by more than it increased the income of the farmer, an opportunity for a bargain would 
become available whereby the cattle-raiser would pay the farmer to discontinue cultivation of 
the land so that he could use the land.   
 Coase also emphasizes the reciprocal nature of the economic problem of property 
rights utilization.  
We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.  To avoid the harm to B would 
inflict harm on A.  The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed 
to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A (Coase 1960, 2)? 
Both actors inflict harm on each other.  The farmer inflicts harm on the cattle-raiser if he 
builds a fence preventing the cattle-raiser from earning the higher income that he otherwise 
could obtain in the absence of a fence, while the cattle-raiser inflicts harm on the farmer’s 
crops in the absence of the fence.  If the cost of building a fence is too much and the cattle 
often destroy his crops, the problem is reciprocal in that both inflict damage on each other.   
However, when the pricing mechanism does not operate so smoothly (transaction 
costs exist), efficient outcomes are difficult to achieve.  Courts may handle the solution to the 
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economic problem of liability.  These third party institutions determine who is at fault and 
who must pay by determining who has rights to which property.  Even though the problem 
may be reciprocal economically, as Coase says, that may not be the case in the eyes of the 
law because it is too costly to determine the efficient level at which one should compensate 
the other.  The court may find that reciprocality is too difficult to determine: the cattle 
trespassed on the farmer’s land and therefore the cattle-owner must pay some amount in 
damages to compensate the farmer.  But, because there are transaction costs, it would be 
difficult to discover the precise amount at which optimal efficiency for the utilization of the 
land would be obtained through side payments. 
In the economic universe outlined by Coase, in which property rights are fully 
defined and enforced, economic rights and efficient outcomes are the final consideration in 
determining how a resource will be used.  If it is more efficient for the cattle-raiser to pay the 
farmer a sum of money to allow his cattle to roam on the farmer’s land, then that is the best 
solution.  The cattle-raiser pays the farmer a fair amount for the use of the land and efficiency 
is obtained when both parties maximize their profits.  
 Underlying the Coase theorem, which makes it important to this study, is the 
assumption of well-defined property rights.  He suggests that if ownership is well defined, 
and the transaction costs are zero, the optimal outcome – efficiency – will result because 
owners will be able to costlessly evaluate the value of different outcomes regarding exchange 
and investment.  The cattle-raiser pays the farmer to allow cattle to roam the farmer’s 
property and the side payment is slightly larger than the farmer’s next best use of the land.  If 
transactions costs are not zero, or the property rights are not well defined or enforced, the 
bargaining process may not work well, and the efficient outcome may not result.   
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2.3 PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES 
Property rights regimes govern the ownership of assets.  They specify which property can be 
owned, if at all, and who, if anyone, has the rights to utilize the property for investment, 
exploitation, and exchange.  
There are four basic types of property rights regimes: open access, government, 
communal, and private individual.  They can be thought of in terms of the level of 
individualization of the ownership of, or access to, a given property: open access regimes 
have zero individualization and are open to everyone. Open access regimes essentially 
consist of unowned property: “assets for which there is no limit on access, such as a city 
street (Anderson and McChesney, 2003, 60).”  Such regimes often result in over-exploitation 
(i.e., the optimal utilization of the resource, where marginal revenue and value equals the 
opportunity cost of utilizing more of the resource, is surpassed because more entrepreneurs 
will attempt to gain rents until the average revenue equals the average cost), known as 
common pool losses, and premature exploitation (because there is a rush to seize the gains 
from the resource before access to the resource is extinguished) (Anderson and McChesney, 
2003, 61-65; Hardin 1968).  In open access regimes, “users have neither the rights nor much 
incentive to manage the resource and invest in improving it (Eggertsson 2003, 76).”  
Government property rights regimes fall in the interstices and cannot be easily 
categorized in terms of its level of individualization or access.  These regimes are “regulated 
by bureaucrats with neither private rights to the property’s benefits nor private obligations to 
bear its costs, which typically accrue to the public treasury or to some non-controlling third 
party (Anderson and McChesney 2003, 59).”  The property may be regarded as public, 
though utilized by an agency of the government for various reasons.  Nongovernmental 
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actors may or may not have access to government property depending on the agency and the 
government’s purpose for the property. Also, government property rights regimes may 
harness some of the benefits of reducing transaction costs, as in the case of a firm that may 
internalize transaction costs, and give government agents more incentive to consider the 
economic consequences of their decisions about how to utilize the resource.  In this there are 
similar utilization incentives compared to the individual and communal regimes.  However, 
who runs the state and who are its agents me be important determinants in the utilization of 
the resource (North 1981, 20-33). 
Communal and private individual property rights regimes have similar characteristics 
to each other and the government regime in that they are more exclusive than open access 
regimes.  Individual ownership is the most exclusive and allows more control over the 
resource for the owner. Property is strictly individually owned and all other actors are 
excluded from commanding the resource unless the owner grants them rights.  Owners are 
neither necessarily concerned nor affected by others’ preferences about the use of the 
property.  Because individuals are vested in their property and all others are excluded from 
utilizing the property, it is more secure (assuming low enforcement costs) and their 
prosperity is linked more to the economic outcomes of their choices (De Alessi 2003, 109). 
Communal property rights regimes are limited access regimes governed by those who 
control the commons, such as in the case of a park district or a community pool or a pasture 
for grazing animals owned by a group of farmers.  A group of people owns the commons and 
determines how the gains from it will be distributed.  As in the case of private individual 
regimes, communal property rights ties owners as a group (and individuals) more closely to 
the consequences of their decisions about how to utilize the property.  However, because 
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there are more owners of the property, and hence more preferences with which to contend, 
utilization may end up suboptimal for some, though better than if they were not in the regime 
at all. 
Communal and individual private property rights regimes incentivize owners to invest 
and improve the resource they own. They “promote investment in maintaining and improving 
resources, development of new institutions and technologies, and a faster, fuller response to 
changes in circumstances.  Outputs and incomes are larger (in these regimes) than under 
alternative arrangements (De Alessi, 2003, 108).”  Open access regimes tend to lead to over-
exploitation and a race to exploit the resource quickly.  While government regimes may 
internalize transaction costs and bear some of the benefits similar to how individual 
ownership regimes do for the individual, they are not owned by individuals or a group, but 
rather by the state for purposes designated by the state.  Who controls the state and policy 
decisions, then, is an important determinant for how the resource is utilized.  
2.3.1 EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES 
In attempting to understand how a property rights regime change may affect political 
stability, it is important to understand something of the evolution of property rights regimes.  
 The question of how property rights regimes come about is well studied.  Demsetz 
offers a model of individual wealth maximization to explain the evolution of property rights: 
“If the main allocative function of property rights is the internalization of beneficial and 
harmful effects, then the emergence of property rights can be understood best by their 
association with the emergence of new or different beneficial and harmful effects (Demsetz 
1967, 350).”  That is, “…property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains 
of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization (Demsetz 1967, 350).”  By 
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internalizing externalities, transaction costs are reduced.  Ownership is clearer and the 
problem of liability, as in the Coase problem regarding cattle-raisers and farmers, may be 
cheaper to solve.  When some jolt changes the costs and benefits of the existing property 
rights regime, a more efficient regime will replace the old one.  For example, if the farmer’s 
land value, and all of the farmers’ land surrounding the cattle-raiser, decreases so much as to 
become relatively unserviceable to farm, say because of erosion, they all may find it 
worthwhile to leave the farmland fallow, or even abandon the land altogether, essentially 
turning the surrounding area into an open range (open access property rights regime) for the 
cattle-raiser.   
However, as is well discussed in the literature, the problem with Demsetz’s theory 
regarding benefits and costs is that it does not provide a mechanism by which property rights 
come about.  Banner makes the point, “Property rights cannot simply be assumed, like other 
goods, to be produced in a pattern that responds to the changing costs and benefits of 
producing them.  They can be produced formally by a government or informally by the 
cooperation of individuals in the creation of a social norm, but either way, the production of a 
property right is necessarily a collective endeavor (Banner 2002, S360).”  
Property rights entrepreneurs may play a role in property rights regime change.  
Entrepreneurs are those who are alert to the possibility of accruing rents not seen by others 
that would become available by better-defined and enforced property rights.  The 
entrepreneur sees and establishes “property rights that eliminate open-access dissipation of 
these rents (Anderson and Hill 2002, S491).”  Referring to Israel Kirzner, Competition and 
Entrepreneurship, Anderson and Hill note that the allocation solution to maximizing benefits 
is not simply found by some kind of mechanical computation.  Rather allocation decisions 
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require an alertness to profit opportunities - that is, alertness to “the very perception of the 
ends-means framework within which allocation and economizing is to take place (Anderson 
and Hill 2002, S491).” 
This alertness is crucial to the discovery of shifts in the benefits and costs of 
property rights creation.  In effect, the entrepreneur is discovering previously 
unowned or unpriced attributes of the resource, and it is the perception of the rents 
associated with ownership of scarce, unique resources that drives his incentive to 
define and enforce property rights to them (Anderson and Hill 2002, S492). 
To prevent the dissipation of rents, the entrepreneur keeps this knowledge to himself, so as to 
minimize dissipation of the potential rents from his unique perspicacity, and seeks the 
definition and enforcement of rights over the property in which he has discovered the 
potential rents.   
 Changes in three main conditions may lead entrepreneurs to perceive an opportunity 
for economic advantage and to invest in property rights regime change.  These three 
conditions “serve as shocks to prevailing equilibrium conditions regarding property 
institutions, where the benefits and costs of existing arrangements to politically influential 
parties have been in balance (Libecap 1989, 16).” 
First, changing relative prices, a market force, may alter the cost-benefit function for 
the entrepreneur.  When the value of some resource is very little, there is less incentive to 
protect the rights to that resource because the loss of the property does not inflict too much 
damage.  However, if the value of the resource is very large, the incentive to protect property 
rights is greater.  For example, Anderson and Hill point out: “As long as an incremental unit 
of land in the West was worth little, property rights entrepreneurs would not put effort into 
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restricting entry.  As land values rose, however, the return on restricting entry increased and 
so did definition and enforcement activities.  Initially, settlers simply announced their claims 
through newspapers and signs.  Over time their efforts became more organized as they 
formed associations or clubs which were specific contractual arrangements with other settlers 
on the frontier to resolve internal conflicts over property rights (Anderson and Hill 2003, 
126).”1 
The size of the price change of the property may also affect how politicians react to 
the demands for changes in property rights definition and enforcement.  “The larger the price 
change, the greater will be the pressure for a redistribution of wealth and, correspondingly, 
the greater will be the demands by current owners for more protection of existing property 
rights (Libecap 1989, 18).”  
 The second condition that may affect entrepreneurial perception of the cost-benefit 
function in the formation of property rights is technology.  The availability of technology for 
the definition and enforcement of property rights affects the opportunity to do so.  Anderson 
and Hill point to the invention of barbed wire on the Great Plains as a cost-reducing 
invention for cattle raisers.  Barbed wire fences produced enclosure and reduced the cost of 
defining and enforcing ownership over the cattle by negating the expenditure of human 
resources to herd cattle spread across vast areas of land (Anderson and Hill 2003, 129). 
Changes in technology may also induce productivity gains.  Prior to barbed wire, 
cattle raisers had to incur the costs of rounding up cattle twice a year for branding calves and 
                                                
1 Similar relationships between the increased value of the property and increased 
specification of property rights has been talked about by Randall Akee.  This is alluded to in: 
Akee, Randall.  “Checkerboards and Coase: The Effect of Property Institutions on Efficiency 
in Housing Markets,” Journal of Law and Economics, 52:2, 395-410. 
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marketing.  The cattlemen created associations and set the dates for roundups, deciding who 
would participate so as to reduce duplicate roundups and for settling disputes over cattle 
ownership with members and nonmembers of the association.  This association was a cost-
reducer itself, but was still more costly than enclosure with barbed wire (Anderson and Hill 
2003, 129). 
A third condition includes changes in preferences and the political environment.  
“Shifts in the political influence of competing claimants also can lead to new contracting for 
property rights…All things equal, those interest groups with greater wealth, size, and 
homogeneity will have more resources to influence politicians regarding the assignment of 
property rights, more votes to attract attention to their demands, and more cohesion to be 
effective lobbyists (Libecap 1989, 17).” 
 Collective action costs and benefits affect the definition and enforcement of property 
rights by entrepreneurs.  As exemplified in the creation of associations prior to the invention 
of barbed wire, “individuals can take advantage of scale economies in defending property 
rights and can encompass more potential spillover effects (Anderson and Hill 2003, 130).”  
As Anderson and Hill note, the optimal size and type of collective action is important.  
Transaction costs increase as the collective’s size increases.  While the collective grows 
larger it may also have more free riders and require more monitoring of agents who are 
acting on behalf of the collective.  Larger collectives may be better at exclusion, but will also 
have higher collective action costs (Anderson and Hill 2003, 130). 
One of the main critiques of Demsetz’s thesis on property rights regime emergence 
points to the role of the state in the definition and enforcement of property rights.  Sened 
says, “Demsetz fails to distinguish between the performance of the economy and the political 
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structure that allows it to perform.  He overlooks the distinction between the content of 
property rights and the structure that protects property rights.  The former can be properly 
exchanged in the market only if the latter are well defined (Sened 1997, 35).” 
Enforcement and definition of property rights by the state is of primary focus in 
understanding the origins of property rights regimes.  In Douglass North’s analysis in 
Structure and Change in Economic History, and emphasized by Sened, “scarcity and the 
need to internalize externalities, or reduce transaction costs, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the emergence of property rights.  If Demsetz’s conditions were sufficient for 
the emergence of property rights, we would expect more uniformity across societies in the 
evolution of institutions that protect property rights (Sened 1997, 36).”  
Political institutions affect the definition and enforcement of property rights regimes, 
and thus the efficiency of those regimes.  Governments may control resources, as in the 
government property rights regime talked about above, and they may define and enforce 
those of others, too.  While conventions (i.e., social norms) may play an important part in 
definition and enforcement, government can have an important discriminatory effect.  Banner 
suggests that oligarchs who control both the resources and political institutions can in a sense 
act as entrepreneurs by altering the property rights regime concerning those resources.  
Because of the high costs of ascertaining proper valuation and compensation regarding 
everyone’s rights and interests, transitions led by such oligarchs tend to be distributionally 
favorable to the interests of the oligarchs.  That is, politicians have an incentive to favor their 
self-interest because it is more costly not to do so. Banner’s examples come from colonial 
authorities changing functional, communal property regimes based on usufructuary to spatial, 
individual-owned regimes common to modern western property law.  He concludes, 
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“(powerful oligarchies may) overcome the problem of administrative cost (in property rights 
regime transitions) simply by not being particularly rigorous in the valuation and assignment 
of the property rights of the majority (parentheticals added) (Banner 2002, S369).” But, as 
will be discussed in the following sections, discrimination may create problems, particularly 
against whom the distribution of the new property rights regime discriminates and how the 
change disrupts the status quo equilibrium of resources, which may lead to political 
instability. 
 Banner’s point is important because it introduces the role of the state and the impact 
that can be had on the emergence of property rights by who holds power in the political 
institutions.  While conventions may initiate property rights, the state can impact the security 
and distribution of those rights.  This theory essentially suggests that those who can control 
the political institutions can control the distributional allocation of property rights, which 
affects whom may do well in an economy.  What is more, it is not necessarily guaranteed that 
those in charge of the political institutions will produce a property rights regime that is 
efficient.  In fact, they could just as well produce a less efficient structure. 
Property rights entrepreneurs within government and outside of it alter property rights 
regimes.  It is the “alternative paths available to entrepreneurs who could create property 
rights or redistribute existing rights from one individual or group to another” that is important 
in determining whether efficient allocation of resources will be obtained (Anderson and Hill 
2003, 119).  Institutions may affect these alternative paths.  The interests and utility functions 
of entrepreneurs in their pursuit of profit may not produce positive net gains; but, “by 
channeling their efforts into redistributing existing property rights or acting opportunistically 
in contractual agreements, they can play negative-sum games,” in which the outcome may 
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benefit some more than others, while on the whole, producing a less efficient outcome 
(Anderson and Hill 2003, 125). 
To understand more about property rights regime evolution one needs to consider the 
role of coercion.  In the original distribution of property rights, there is the notion of “might 
makes right.”  Umbeck claims that “ultimately all ownership rights are based on the abilities 
of individuals, or groups of individuals, to forcefully maintain exclusivity (Umbeck 1981, 
39).”  Even if one is able to claim “finders keepers” over some resource, whether one is able 
to exclude others from somehow seizing or using that resource is critical to ownership.  A 
farmer in Ethiopia may till a plot of land or participate in a communal property rights regime 
for most of his or her lifetime, yet if the government may seize and sell that land to the Prince 
of Saudi Arabia without as much as giving the farmer choice or compensation in the deal, 
how secure were his rights over that land in the first place (Rice 2009, MM46)?  If the farmer 
doesn’t leave the land, the Ethiopian government may end up forcing the farmer off the land 
so that the Saudi Arabian prince can till the land for his own people.  
In this instance, the farmer may have little power to stop the government because the 
government has a monopoly on the use of violence.  There is no explicit agreement between 
the government and the farmer over the rights to the property, but because the government 
has the force to expel the farmer, the farmer has the unenviable choice of whether he would 
rather bear the costs of attempting to continue to attempt to claim exclusive right to that land 
or move somewhere else to restart his life and avoid the violence of the government. Libecap 
explains:  
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To maintain claims to valuable assets or to wrest control from others through the use 
of force, competing claimants have incentive to divert labor and capital inputs from 
socially valued production to predatory and defensive activities (Libecap 1989, 13).” 
While it could be said that initially the farmer had rightful claim to the property, the “might 
makes right” argument makes the point that the distribution may be equal to the amount of 
force that can be weighed in protecting that right, not necessarily the distribution that is most 
efficient.  Of course, such an argument perhaps contradicts the legal notion that those who 
produce and improve their resources (which otherwise would have been unused) also have a 
right of ownership.  But, justification might be given by the Ethiopian government that the 
Prince of Saudi Arabia may be able to not only utilize the land more efficiently, but also 
provide a side payment to Ethiopia for renting the land.  Their justification then is based on 
economic rights, not legal rights.  Whether or not this side payment ends up in the hands of 
entrepreneurial politicians or the previous tillers of the farmland is a distributional concern 
largely decided by those whose might makes right – the rulers of the government.  The poor 
farmers may be not so lucky to receive their share of the economic rights (i.e., the side 
payment). Thus, without the power to affect the choices made through the political 
institutions, ownership may be a tenuous prospect.  
2.3.2 PREDATION VERSUS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
“The existence of a state is essential for economic growth; the state, however, is the 
source of man-made economic decline.”  –Douglass North (North 1981, 20) 
The problem of the state’s role as definer and enforcer of property rights is that if the state is 
strong enough to effectively enforce rights, it is also strong enough to take those rights away.  
If those who control the political institutions and the monopoly on violence believe that they 
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can profit more from predation, they may be less inclined to define and enforce property 
rights in a manner which minimizes transaction costs and strives for economic efficiency.  
They may see that predation is the more profitable route because of shortened time horizons 
(politicians pay the costs of developing institutions immediately, while the benefits accrue in 
the future), the need to accommodate support groups, and the difficulty of credibly 
committing to those who rely on secure property rights. 
2.4 INTRAJURISDICTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISCRIMINATION	  
Intrajurisdictional property rights regime discrimination is an outcome of government’s 
internally consistent and jurisdictionally delimited definition and enforcement of property 
rights that specifically treats some people differently than others.  The discriminating 
property rights regime may affect the distribution of resources within its jurisdiction 
positively for some people and negatively for others by specifying and enforcing ownership 
rights of a particular resource in a way that favors the former over the latter.  
2.4.1 PROPERTY RIGHTS DISCRIMINATION AND DISTRIBUTIONAL 
CONFLICT 
Intrajurisdictionally discriminatory property rights regime changes can be the consequence of 
distributional conflict between parties with a stake in the outcome, who treat different people 
differently.  Libecap refers to the specification and alteration of property rights as 
contracting.  He states, “contracting includes both private bargaining to assign or adjust 
informal ownership arrangements and lobby efforts among private claimants, politicians, and 
bureaucrats to define, administer, and modify more formal property institutions (Libecap 
1989, 11).”  In this process, Flores suggests, “economic agents demand – and politicians can 
provide – property rights discrimination, protecting certain groups’ rights while willfully 
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ignoring or even deliberately violating other groups’ rights (Flores 2008, 3).”  For example, 
politicians have incentives to favor support groups.  Support groups may be the ones who 
help politicians get into power as well as retain power once it is achieved.  There may be 
incentive to produce property rights enforcement that benefits support groups more than a 
broader, less discriminating enforcement regime that may increase efficiency.  
Knight takes this further to suggest that actors maximize their distributional gains and 
argues that whether or not institutions produce economic efficiency is thus a by-product of 
actors asserting their strategic advantage: 
Social institutions affect the distribution of benefits from the numerous interactions 
that constitute social life…The forms of these benefiting institutions vary across 
time within a particular society and across communities and societies at any 
particular time…What separates these distinct forms is their distributional 
consequences.  …Institutions are not created to constrain groups or societies in an 
effort to avoid suboptimal outcomes but, rather, are the by-product of substantive 
conflicts over the distributions inherent in social outcomes.  According to this 
conception, the main goal of those who develop institutional rules is to gain strategic 
advantage vis-à-vis other actors, and therefore, the substantive content of those rules 
should generally reflect distributional concerns.  The resulting institutions may or 
may not be socially efficient: It depends on whether or not the institutional form that 
distributionally favors the actors capable of asserting their strategic advantage is 
socially efficient (Knight 1992, 40). 
In sum, outcomes may be the result of distributional conflict, not necessarily some desired 
level of efficiency: actors may seek to maximize their strategic advantage to maximize the 
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benefits of institutional change.  Whether or not the change in the institution leads to a 
socially efficient outcome is dependent on the nature of the distributional conflict and the 
capability of the different actors to affect the change in the institution to their own benefit. 
Inefficiency comes from actors’ self-interest and “their pursuit of a less efficient alternative 
that gives them a greater individual gain,” not necessarily from a lack of information or 
imperfect knowledge (Knight 1992, 40). 
Libecap supports the notion of distributional conflict and expectations as an inherent 
part of political interaction.  Actors evaluate changes to institutions in terms of the effect of 
the institutional change on their productive possibilities.  If the outcome is expected to lead to 
negative projections, they will be less likely to support the institutional change: 
…the bargaining stands taken by the various parties depend upon how they view 
their welfare under the new arrangement relative to the status quo.  Estimates of the 
likely net gains or losses from institutional change faced by each party require an 
evaluation of the overall productive possibilities with the new property rights 
arrangement and the distribution of rents it authorizes.  The bargaining parties must 
see their welfare improved or at least made no worse off in order for them to support 
institutional change, and each party has incentive to seek as large a share of rents 
under the new arrangement as possible (Libecap 1989, 11). 
Libecap goes on to point out that this competition among contracting parties is costly to 
society.  The competition may alter the definition of rights, and by that also affect “the nature 
and size of the aggregate benefits that are possible (Libecap 1989, 11).” What is more, 
politicians and other societal actors may respond over concerns about how the property rights 
regime changes may affect distributional norms.  Libecap explains: 
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The outcome of political bargaining over property rights will depend not only on the 
political power of the contesting interest groups involved, but it also may depend on 
how the wealth distributions associated with different interest group demands blend 
with prevailing distributional norms.  A demand for an allocation of property that 
seems to be extreme relative to accepted practices may broaden the political debate 
by eliciting a response from other interests who have a stake in the current 
distribution of wealth.  The entry of additional parties in political contracting over 
adjustments in property rights adds to the demands that must be considered and 
reconciled by politicians (Libecap 1989, 18).” 
Changes in property rights definition and enforcement that are not consistent with prevailing 
expectations about distributional norms may lead to higher political costs for politicians. Not 
only might radical changes lead to rejection in courts, they might also lead to the offense of 
many interest groups that ultimately affect the politician’s job, or even cause political 
instability (Libecap 1989).  
 This description of the distributional nature of intrajurisdictional property rights 
discrimination is one example of how regimes may discriminate within their jurisdiction and 
decrease the likelihood of efficient outcomes.  But, there may also be interjurisdictional 
property rights discrimination. 
2.5 INTERJURISDICTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISCRIMINATION 
Interjurisdictional property rights regime discrimination is the outcome of different 
jurisdictions providing different principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures for 
the specification and enforcement of rights regarding a particular resource.  While 
jurisdictions have responsibilities to their own citizens and not necessarily to those of other 
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jurisdictions, citizens of one jurisdiction may feel that another jurisdiction’s property rights 
regime discriminates against them.  Interjurisdictional property rights discrimination will be 
the focus of analysis in answering the question of interest for the remainder of the paper. 
2.6 CONSEQUENCES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS DISCRIMINATION 
Discrimination creates winners and losers by altering opportunities.  Losers must make a 
decision as to how they will respond to property rights discrimination.  Discrimination will 
not always lead losers to protest, rebel, create insurrections, or violently attempt to alter 
circumstances individually or collectively; they may decide they can affect change through 
political institutions.  They may also choose to be politically apathetic and move on to 
another occupation, perhaps seeing too high the costs in contesting the regime.   
When the property rights regime discriminates, economic losers may be created.  The 
distribution of property rights definition and enforcement makes them worse off. In the 
absence of government enforcement, which would otherwise provide affirmation for their 
expectations about property rights ownership, investment may become more risky and costly. 
There may be more costs and uncertainty about how much to expend to protect and define 
their rights to use, exchange, and exclude others from their property.2  This negatively affects 
the cost-benefit calculus of investment for the excluded individual.  Significant economic 
opportunities may be lost: they may not reap as much gain from their activities because of 
increased transaction costs and the decreased value of their property.  They may have more 
                                                
2 In a laboratory study, Duffy and Kim analyzed whether individuals choose production and 
to defend their resources or to predate on those of others, as well as how governments that 
reduce the costs of defense of resources affect this decision.  They come to the conclusion 
that “the role of the state in making and enforcing a collective choice in the level of defense 
can indeed lead to a substantial improvement in the welfare of agents relative to the stateless, 
anarchic equilibrium (Duffy and Kim 2005).” 
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uncertainty and be less likely to invest in human or physical capital (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2010; de Soto 1989, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson 2005; Akee 2009; Kimbrough 2010). 
The choice of whether to rebel against property rights discrimination is an investment 
decision for the losers. They can expend their resources in political activity to alter the 
property rights regime or in entrepreneurial activity adapting to the new property rights 
regime.  If pursuing new entrepreneurial opportunities in the new property rights regime 
produces less net benefits relative to engaging in political activity, political activity may be 
the best solution.  Conflict in the form of political violence may arise when these individuals 
cannot affect policy through the political institutions. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
I suggest that interjurisdictional property rights discrimination creates an increase in costs for 
property rights owners from other jurisdictions against whom the regime discriminates.  
Costs come from expending more resources to define and enforce their ownership rights over 
that resource when coming into contact with the discriminating property rights regime.   
 Increased costs negatively alter owners’ expectations regarding the relative gains 
from the resource, which may create discontent.  People invest in resources with some 
expectations regarding the probability of gains from ownership of that resource.  When those 
investment expectations regarding relative gains are negatively impacted by infringement on 
their property in another regime, those discriminated against may become discontented.  
 The group of discontented may attempt to end those negative effects by attempting to 
redress the other jurisdiction’s regime through norms of the available political institutions.   
 If utilization of the political institutions for altering the cost function of property 
ownership in the other regime’s jurisdiction is unsuccessful, the discontented may seek to 
redress the discriminating property rights regime outside of the political institutions.  
 Political violence may result if the discontented see no more effective option to 
achieve their ends outside of the political institutions.   
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
In this paper, with the purpose being to understand how interjurisdictional property rights 
discrimination may lead to civil war, the focus will be on one case, the American Civil War.  
In this case, property rights discrimination between free and slave state regimes regarding 
slavery played an important role in the causation of the Civil War.  
Determining the cause of any outcome is difficult if we do not set parameters for an 
acceptable explanation of the outcome.  In the case of this paper, I do not look to understand 
every single facet of the causal mechanism that pushed the country to Civil War, but rather to 
understand how one particular force, interjurisdictional property rights discrimination, could 
lead to potentially violent political outcomes.  Thousands upon thousands of pages have been 
written on the issue of slavery and the American Civil War and it is not my goal to develop a 
new history or to make a significant contribution to that history.  But, my goal is to 
understand the key factors in the causal mechanism to elucidate the potential causal 
relationship between property rights discrimination and civil war. 
Why choose the U.S. Civil War to understand how interjurisdicitonal property rights 
discrimination may cause civil war?  The reasons behind choosing the U.S. Civil War case 
are: 
1. The slave issue is widely believed by historians to be the fundamental 
political issue of the antebellum period that led to the Civil War 
(McPherson 1988; Conrad and Meyer 1958; Huston 1999; Blight 2008; 
Grunderson 1974; Ransom and Sutch 1988; Nash and Jeffrey 2001; Nevins 
1947-61; Potter 1976; Ransom1989; Link 2003; Levine 2005)..   
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2. The two regimes were separated jurisdictionally as free and slave states yet 
were forced into contact with each other because a) the jurisdictions were 
adjacent or proximate and b) the jurisdictions operated under the legal 
superjurisdiction of the United States government.  The Federal 
government provided an opportunity to ameliorate the interjurisdictional 
property rights regime discrimination, but also served as a battleground for 
the competing interests (e.g., Fugitive Slave Laws, Supreme Court 
Decisions, and the admittance of new free or slave states).  Free soil and 
slave interests were able to compromise through the political institutions 
during the antebellum period until the election of Lincoln in 1860, when 
the slave state interests felt they could no longer compromise through the 
federal political institutions.   
3. Westward expansion of the country and the admittance of new states in the 
western territories provided a political extrainstitutional battleground for 
those who had a stake in either regime.  The conflicting expectations of 
free soilers and slave-owners regarding the ownership of labor converged 
in these battleground territories and arguably erupted into localized civil 
wars.  
4. The U.S. Civil War case may provide generalizeable conclusions regarding 
the theory to be tested.  Since property rights discrimination was between 
state jurisdictions, there maybe generalizeability regarding the relationship 
between interstate wars property rights regime discrimination among 
nation-states.  
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This is not to say that the U.S. Civil War is a perfect case.  Interjurisdictional property rights 
discrimination and the effects it has on costs of ownership, expectations of future outcomes, 
and the psychology and resultant actions of those discriminated against, is but one possible 
line of reasoning to understand and predict civil war. Other variables may have had an 
impact.  Was it slave power, “unctuous fury,” a clash of civilizations, Northern or Southern 
aggression, states’ rights?  Greed or grievance?  Perhaps a bit of all of that is true.  But, as 
pointed out in reason number one for choosing this case, few modern historians deny that the 
sectional issue of slavery was the primary divisive issue of the time that led to the war.  So, 
this case should provide a good opportunity to test the theory. 
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CHAPTER 5:  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ANTEBELLUM AMERICA, 
1789-1861 
 
When Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin in 1793, cotton was still yet a small-time crop in 
the South.  Prior to the cotton gin, separating seeds from cotton was done by hand, which was 
slow and inefficient.  However, over the next sixty-eight years after the invention, cotton 
boomed and became the staple product of the South.  But, the gin was not enough by itself.  
Slavery provided the cheap manpower necessary to produce economies of scale in cotton 
production.  With the increase in economies of scale, large cotton plantations grew across the 
South, spreading westward and taking slavery with it.  The boom of the cotton economy in 
the first sixty years of the 19th century would prove significantly important for the institution 
of slavery.  While at the Constitutional Convention some Northerners believed that the 
institution of slavery would peter out as it appeared to be doing in the Northern states, with 
the growing profitability of cotton and slavery in the 19th century, the institution became ever 
more important to the South.  Total slave value rose from about $250 million in 1805 to over 
$3 billion by 1860.  The year before the Civil War slaves, as an asset category, were worth 
more than all of the country’s manufacturing and railroads combined; only the land itself was 
more valuable than slaves.  
As profitability rose, so too did irritability.  The institution of slavery became a more 
contentious political issue as the 19th century wore on.  Much land was available for 
westward expansion, but as more Americans began to occupy this land, territories were 
pressed into statehood.  The fundamental question to be answered was: would slavery be 
legalized or outlawed in these new states?  The question most importantly had implications 
for the ownership of slaves; the very notion of outlawing slavery in a state challenged the 
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legitimacy of the property rights institution.  Yet, the question had important implications for 
the political power of slave owners as well: while outlawing slavery challenged their 
property rights in slaves, it also meant more free soil politicians would run the country, 
ultimately reducing the power of Southern interests, who would defend the institution of 
slavery.  This consideration of political power is important for understanding the causes of 
the Civil War because it tied back to the issue of property rights ownership in slaves.  
How did property rights in slaves become a source of conflict?  If slavery had not 
been so widespread in the South and if it had not been so profitable, how likely would have 
been civil war?  Would the south have not compromised instead of waging a costly war; 
would it have been able to accept westward expansion of free states?   
One might expect that the value of slaves had something to do with the Southern 
interest in secession.  As we will see, owning and trading slaves was a highly profitable 
business.  But, it was the recognition of property rights in humans that was the foundation of 
this value.  For, without this recognition – the regime that defined and enforced ownership of 
humans – the viability of slave ownership would have been on shaky grounds for existence 
because of the ease with which slaves could “steal” themselves in an environment that did 
not protect ownership of humans.  Definition and enforcement of property rights in humans 
by the local, state, and federal governance institutions of the United States was critical to the 
continuance of the institution. 
But, importantly, there was interjurisdictional property rights discrimination 
regarding slavery among the states.  While in the South slave ownership was buttressed by 
social norms and legal procedures supporting property rights definition and enforcement of 
slave ownership, in the North social norms and legal procedures worked against the 
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definition and enforcement of Southern slave ownership.  This bifurcation of the property 
rights regime, which in one region discriminated against slave owners and in the other 
discriminated against blacks as slaves, was a key issue in the onset of the Civil War. 
5.1 THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY: COTTON AND SLAVES	  
Slavery was a vital and viable institution for the Southern economy in the antebellum period 
(Wright 1987; Yasumba 1971; Aitken 1971; Lee and Passell 1979; Fogel and Engerman 
1974; Johnson 1999).  Facilitated by the slave trade, slavery spread westward across the 
southern part of the country.  As the cotton economy boomed, the value of both cotton and 
slaves increased. By the decade before the Civil War, slave prices were rising at a faster rate 
than cotton prices and whites in the Cotton South were deriving a significant portion of their 
income from slaves.  By 1860, slaves were the second most valuable asset in the nation, next 
to the land itself.   
In 1790 the Southern states produced less than 50,000 bales of cotton.  By 1820, they 
produced about 500,000 bales; 1830, 1,000,000 bales; 1840, 2,000,000 bales; 1850, 
3,000,000 bales; and, in 1855, nearly 4,500,000 bales (Fogel 1974, 90).  
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FIGURE 1 – Quantity of Cotton Output (mil. lbs.), 1805-1859 
 
Sources: Roger L. Ransom, Conflict and Compromise, (Cambridge University Press, 1989).  U.S. Census 
Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United states, Colonial Times to 1970, part 1 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1976), 
series K-551, p. 517. 
 
Figure 1 shows the rise of cotton output from 1805 to 1859 in millions of pounds of 
cotton.  In 1805, the South produced 60 million pounds of cotton, whereas, by 1859 1.712 
billion pounds of cotton were produced.  
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FIGURE 2 - Distribution of cotton production in the South, 1821
 
Source: Lee and Passell, A New Economic View of American History, 157-164. 
FIGURE 3 - Distribution of cotton production in the South, 1859
 
Source: Lee and Passell, A New Economic View of American History, 157-164. 
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In 1821, as seen in Figure 2, cotton production was scarcely scattered across the 
South, with a band of production across South Carolina into Georgia, and isolated groupings 
of production along the Mississippi River bordering Louisiana and Mississippi, and sparsely 
distributed about Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia.  By 1859 (Figure 3), 
cotton production was densely distributed across the Deep South, thickly along the 
Mississippi River bordering Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as with a thick band 
spreading from central-eastern Mississippi through Georgia to South Carolina.  By this time, 
cotton production was also significant in eastern Texas and parts of Arkansas and Tennessee 
(Lee and Passell 1979, 157).  
 
FIGURE 4 - Distribution of slaves in the South, 1790 
 
Source: Lee and Passell, A New Economic View of American History, 157-164. 
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FIGURE 5 - Distribution of slaves in the South, 1860 
 
Source: Lee and Passell, A New Economic View of American History, 157-164. 
 
Slavery followed this spread of the cotton economy across the South (Figures 4 and 
5). As can be seen from Table 1, slaves were exported from the southeast coast states during 
this period to supply the demand for cheap labor to the west.  The main net exporters of 
slaves were at first Delaware, Virginia, and Maryland, later on the Carolina’s, District of 
Columbia, and Kentucky, and in the last decade before the war, Tennessee and Kentucky.  
The enslaved population of the South was a self-reproducing population (see Growth Rate in 
Table 1) and its population increased during the antebellum period, as can be seen in Figure 
6.  The total population grew from about one million in 1804 to over 4 million by the year of 
the civil war.  
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FIGURE 6 - Slave population in the South (in thousands), 1804-1861 
 
Source: Ransom and Sutch, "Capitalists Without Capital: The Burden of Slavery and the Impact of 
Emancipation," Agricultural History (Summer 1988), Tables A.1 and A.4. 
  
With the end of the transatlantic slave trade in 1809, the interstate slave trade became 
the grease in the wheels for the expansion of the cotton and slave economy.  Approximately 
sixty to seventy percent of the interstate slave traffic between 1820 and 1860 was through 
transactions in the slave trade (Tadman 1989, 11-46). 
 Slave trading in the exporting states became a significant contributor to the Southern 
economy.  Slave sales in the “principal exporting states”3 amounted to as much as 15.4%-
19.6% of the value of staple crops in the South (Tadman 1989, 131). At times slave traders 
could make as much as $120,000 in profit a week from selling slaves (Blight 2008).4  In one 
city, Richmond, during 1858 slaves sales “netted” over $4 million (Blight 2007). 
                                                
3 In Tadman’s analysis the principle exporting states are defined as Delaware, Kentucky, 
Maryland, the Carolinas, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 
4 Blight points out that a prime slave hand worth $1,000 in 1860 would be equivalent to the 
price of a new Toyota Camry today. Roughly, $1,000 in 1860 money would be equal to 
about $27,000 today using the CPI.  
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  The value of cotton and slaves rose significantly in the antebellum period.  Overall, 
cotton’s value went up more than 9 times between 1805-1859.  The main growth periods 
were between 1812-16, 1830-35, 1841-51, and 1854-59.  As can be seen in Figures 7 and 8, 
slave and cotton prices were correlated; however, slave prices increased at a greater rate than 
cotton prices in the last decade before the war, as slave speculation increased (Johnson 
1999).5  The price of a “prime field hand” ranged between $700 and $1,300 until the 1850’s, 
during which such slaves were acquired at an average price between $1,122 and $1,564.  The 
average price of all slaves in the South in 1805 was about $308, while in 1861 it was $742 
(Figure 9).   
The weight of the value of slaves in the U.S. economy was immense by the time of 
the Civil War.  The value of all slaves in the United States by 1860 was approximately $3 
billion (Table 2).  This was more than investment in manufacturing and railroads combined.  
The only asset category worth more than slaves were farms. 
 
                                                
5 See Walter Johnson, Soul By Soul, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, 78-116. 
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FIGURE 7 - Value of cotton output (mil. $), 1805-1859 
 
Source: Roger L. Ransom, Conflict and Compromise, (Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
 
FIGURE 8 - Value of all slaves (mil. $), 1805-1859 
Source: Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, "Capitalists without Capital: The Burden of Slavery and the 
Impact of Emancipation," Agricultural History (Fall, 1988), table A.1. 
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FIGURE 9 - Comparison of slave prices, 1805-1860 
Source: Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, "Capitalists without Capital: The Burden of Slavery and the 
Impact of Emancipation," Agricultural History (Fall, 1988), table A.1. 
 
TABLE 2 - Wealth in the U.S. by economic category, 1860 
  
Estimated Value  
(mil. 1860 $) 
Slaves 3,000 
Farms 6,638 
Farm Implements 246 
Investment in Manufacturing 1,050 
Investment in Railroads 1,166 
Bank Capital 227 
Home Productions 27 
Livestock 1,099 
    
Total 13,452 
Source: James Huston, “Property Rights in Slavery and the Coming of the Civil War,” J. of Southern 
History, 1999 (2), 254. 
0	  
500	  
1,000	  
1,500	  
2,000	  
2,500	  
3,000	  
3,500	  
1800	   1805	   1810	   1815	   1820	   1825	   1830	   1835	   1840	   1845	   1850	   1855	   1860	   1865	  Average	  Price	  of	  All	  Slaves	  in	  South	  ($)	   Price	  of	  Prime	  Male	  in	  New	  Orleans	  ($)	  Value	  of	  All	  Slaves	  In	  The	  South	  (mil.	  $)	  
39 
 
Considering the value of slaves and the value of cotton that they produced, it is not 
too unobvious that slaves provided a significant portion of their owners’ income.  As can be 
seen from Table 3, slaves were quite important to the income of their owners.  In the cotton 
states slaves provided as much as 41.7 percent of whites’ income, with a range of 19.4%-
41.7%, while in non-cotton states slaves provided between 17.4%-19.4% of whites’ income.   
TABLE 3 - The fraction of Whites’ Income from Slavery, 1860 
 
  
Percent of 
the 
Population 
That Were 
Slaves 
Per Capita 
Earnings 
of Free 
Whites ($) 
Slave 
Earnings 
per Free 
White ($) 
Percent of 
Earnings 
Due to 
Slavery 
          
Alabama 45 120 50 41.7 
South Carolina 57 159 57 35.8 
Florida 44 143 48 33.6 
Georgia 44 136 40 29.4 
Mississippi 55 253 74 29.2 
Louisiana 47 229 54 23.6 
Texas 30 134 26 19.4 
Seven Cotton 
States 
46 163 50 30.6 
          
North Carolina 33 108 21 19.4 
Tennessee 25 93 17 18.3 
Arkansas 26 121 21 17.4 
Virginia 32 121 21 17.4 
          
All 11 States 38 135 35 25.9 
Source: Computed by Roger Ransom from data in Gerald Gunderson (1974: 922, Table 1). Roger Ransom, 
"The Economics of the Civil War," http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/ransom.civil.war.us, Accessed June 7, 
2011. 
 
Slavery was thus a vital investment component in the Southern economy.  Slaves 
were crucial as “capital” inputs to the production of cotton and became financial assets 
themselves in the slave trade as speculators bought and sold slaves for profit.  Slave prices 
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rose significantly prior to the war and were the second highest-valued asset in the nation’s 
economy.   
5.2 INTERJURISDICTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISCRIMINATION  
 
The property rights regime regarding slavery in the antebellum period was bifurcated 
between the regimes of the Northern free states and Southern slave states.   
In the North, ownership of slaves was illegal; nobody could own property rights in 
another human being.  Labor was paid in wages.  Human rights – e.g., personal liberties – 
were respected in law and preferred socially (racism and nativism notwithstanding).  On the 
other hand, in the South, people could own human beings (specifically, blacks), who were 
treated in many ways similarly to any other asset for which one had a property right: slave 
owners could gain from, exclude others from, and exchange their slaves. For example, slaves 
could be utilized in the field to produce cotton, bought and sold in the local slave market in 
the city or with vagabond rural slave traders, and invested in to improve the slave for farm 
use or sale (e.g., breeding and educating future slaves).   
These two regimes, one that guaranteed property rights in slaves and one that did not, 
had important conflictual implications. The primary problems that arose regarding the 
interjurisdictional discrimination of the slave state and the free state property rights regimes 
were threefold.   
1. First, when slave-owners exited free states, they could face questions as to 
whether the “black he was taking with him might not be free or entitled to 
ultimate freedom (Morris 1974, 13).” The possibility of this question being 
legitimately considered increased the risk to slave-owners when bringing 
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slaves into the free states.  A slave owner could not be certain that his 
property rights would be unquestioned by citizens and the courts in free 
states. 
2. Second, when slave owners attempted to reclaim fugitive slaves, they 
encountered an institution that guaranteed due process regarding assertions 
of ownership.  Slave owners could not, as they generally could in the slave 
states, recapture their slaves without going through the courts.  This raised 
the costs of recapture, but was also not a guarantee of reobtaining the slave.  
Contrary to how slave state courts treated slaves; free state courts treated 
its residents as deserving civil rights (e.g., the right “to be secure in one’s 
person”).  Common law legal procedures also jeopardized slave-owners’ 
chances of recapture.  The most important legal procedures were the right 
to trial by jury - especially useful for the abolitionist cause when 
determining whether a black was legally a slave; and especially threatening 
to the slave owner who had to make the case of legal ownership of the 
slave in front of a jury of free state citizens, the prevalence of racism 
notwithstanding – the writ of habeas corpus cum causa,6 and the writ de 
homine replegiando (personal replevin) (Morris 1974, 8-13).  
3. The third problem, which was more of a problem for free states, and which 
contributed to the passing of Personal Liberty Laws in the free states, 
                                                
6 According to the Oxford American Dictionary: Habeas corpus cum causa requires a person 
under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court, especially to secure the person’s 
release unless lawful grounds are shown for their detention.  Literally: You will have the 
body with the cause (of detention).   
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concerned the kidnapping of free men to be sold in slave states (Morris 
1974, 13). 
With these problems the fundamental contradictions caused by interjurisdictional 
property rights discrimination was that free states attempted to protect the civil liberties of 
the individuals who resided in their jurisdictions, while slave-owners demanded recognition 
of their property rights in slaves across jurisdictions.  This clash, which played out at the state 
level during the ante bellum period, grew into a significant national issue by mid-century.  
Personal Liberty Laws were one step in the nationalization of the transjurisdictional issue of 
slave-owner property rights. 
5.2.1 PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS 
Free states passed Personal Liberty Laws, which discriminated against slave-owner property 
rights, to protect free individuals and ameliorate the difficulties that were presented when 
claims were made on alleged fugitive slaves.  One of the first of such Laws was the 
Pennsylvania Fugitive Slave Act of 1826. This Act was an attempt at compromise regarding: 
the federal Fugitive Slave Clause,7 which stipulated that fugitive slaves should be “delivered 
up” to their owners; the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which further stipulated an 
enforcement mechanism by which slaves should be returned to their owners; and, the free 
states’ “responsibility to protect the personal liberty of free blacks (Morris 1974, 46).” 
Because the clause in the Constitution was vague regarding how slaves should be “delivered 
                                                
7 Article 4, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution: “No Person held to Service 
or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence 
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be 
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.” 
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up on claim” of ownership (e.g., should states assist?), the Personal Liberty Laws served as a 
way of clarifying free states’ positions on their interpretations of the clause.   
While enhancing the interjurisdictionally discriminatory nature of the free state 
regime, the Personal Liberty Laws were intrajurisdictionally discriminatory against slave-
owner interests for at least a few reasons.  Some, as Pennsylvania’s Act sought to do, were 
indirect attempts at nullification of the federal laws as they explicitly rejected the “idea of 
voluntary cooperation” and denied the “general right of recaption by self-help alone (Morris 
1974, 46-52).” Furthermore, in the Pennsylvania Act, slave-owners had to provide affidavits 
of ownership and their oaths of ownership could not be admitted as evidence; alleged slaves 
were given time to “obtain evidence to refute the claim;” and, in some cases, slave claimants 
were liable for the costs of imprisonment of the alleged slave (Morris 1974, 52).  Ultimately, 
Acts like this raised the costs of slave reclamation.   
The discriminatory issues of the Personal Liberty Laws regarding the adjudication of 
claims, state cooperation for rendition, and recaption by slave-owners came to the Federal 
Supreme Court.  In Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), the high Court “invalidated the earlier state 
efforts to establish the procedures for adjudicating claims and…validated state 
noncooperation in the rendition process.  At the same time by sustaining a right of recaption 
uninhibited by the presumption of freedom, the “opinion of the court” appeared to deprive 
free men of the equal protection of the laws (Morris 1974, 104).”  So, while states could not 
interfere in the claims of slave-owners, they could also choose not to cooperate in the process 
of slave recapture.  Moreover, states could not inhibit slave-owners who sought to take back, 
without legal process, their property, which was recognized as such federally.  This ruling 
essentially favored the slave-owner in that it made the enforcement costs of slave-owner 
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property rights cheaper by limiting the power of free states to hinder the process of slave 
recapture.  Conversely, it made free men less secure by limiting the state’s power to protect 
the civil liberties of those who resided in its state (Morris 1974). Free states responded by 
forbidding state cooperation in fugitive slave cases. 
By 1850, another attempt, which proved rancorous in the free states, was made to 
buttress slave-owner property rights at the federal level.  The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
created commissioners to hear fugitive slave cases in free states.  Commissioners could issue 
a posse comitatus, which summoned locals to help enforce the law.  The commissioner was 
tasked with deciding whether the claimant had ownership of the person.  If he found in favor 
of the claimant, the commissioner was paid $10, while if he found against the claimant, he 
would be paid $5 (n.b., the commissioners were monetarily incentivized therefore to find in 
favor of claimants).  And, “anyone who obstructed a claimant making a seizure, ‘either with 
or without’ a process, or rescued a runaway, or harbored one, would be subject to a one-
thousand-dollar fine and imprisonment for six months (Morris 1974, 146).”  This provoked 
discriminatory reaction in the free states with the passing of a “new series of personal liberty 
laws (nine between 1842 and 1850) that prohibited the use of state facilities in the recapture 
of fugitives (McPherson 1988, 79).” 
As can be seen in this conflict over the interjurisdictionally bifurcated property rights 
regime regarding slaves, clashing interests highlighted the discriminatory nature of each 
regime.  While one regime discriminated against slave ownership, the other discriminated 
against the civil rights of slaves as humans.  The free states responded to federal Fugitive 
Slave Laws by passing intrajurisdictionally-focused Personal Liberty Laws, which had 
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discriminatory outcomes for slave-owners, while more federal laws were created to enforce 
slave-owner property rights. 
5.3 DIVERGENT INTERESTS  
Westward expansion of the country forced to the surface the divergent interests regarding the 
interjurisdictionally bifurcated property rights regime.  While the Missouri Compromise had 
apparently settled the issue of how to admit future free and slave states, just over 25 years 
later the question arose fresh and created untamable tensions.  This began with the war with 
Mexico and the Wilmot Proviso, then the California gold rush and the Compromise of 1850, 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which nullified the Missouri Compromise, and the Dred Scott 
Supreme Court case.  By 1850 the sectional issue regarding slave-owner property rights 
destroyed one national party and set the stage for the rise of the free-state Republican Party.  
With the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln, the Deep and Middle South southern slave 
states, led by slave-owners in the secession conventions, seceded from the Union. 
In 1820, the Missouri Compromise was struck to develop a framework for future 
admission of free states.  The 36°30′ geographic line demarcated the division of future free 
and slave states.  With a few issues in the 1830s, such as South Carolina’s nullification 
attempt and the Congressional gag rule on abolitionists, the federal Union made it through 
the first four decades of the 19th century without sectional tensions over slavery becoming 
too divisive.  However, as the country expanded westward and acquired territories, political 
tensions rose over the type of property rights regime – slave or free – that would operate in 
the new states.  
The first major rise in tensions occurred in 1846 after the war with Mexico broke out.  
The Wilmot Proviso stipulated in an amendment to an appropriations bill to pay for the war 
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“’neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist’” in the territories to be acquired 
from Mexico (McPherson 1988, 52).  
The next major event that raised sectional tensions was California’s statehood in 
1850. The number of slave and free states in the Union was significant because the more 
states of one kind of property rights regime or the other, the more power that particular 
interest may have in the federal government. The Missouri Compromise had kept the balance 
between slave and free states even for nearly 20 years.  But, California was admitted as a free 
state, which tipped the balance 16:15 in favor of free states to slave states.  While California 
was admitted as a free state, in the compromise slave states received the benefit of the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.  Also, New Mexico and Utah had to organize governments, 
where popular sovereignty would determine whether the state would be slave or free, and the 
slave trade in the District of Columbia was abolished (Nash and Jeffrey 2001, 437). 
The Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 increased tensions yet again.  This “law may have 
been the most important single event pushing the nation toward civil war (McPherson 1988, 
121).” Why?  Because it destroyed the Whig Party, which had been held together by loyalties 
based on the nonsectional interests of both free state and slave state citizens.  The tension 
over the admission of slave or free states drove a stake through the party, wedging apart the 
party’s sectional pro- and anti-slavery interests, and planting the seeds for an “entirely 
northern Republican party” that in a decade would be led to power by Abraham Lincoln 
(McPherson 1988, 121).  The Act stipulated that popular sovereignty would determine 
whether a new state became a slave or free state, nullifying the 36°30′ line established in the 
Missouri Compromise.  Two years later slaveholders and free staters marched into Kansas 
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and the state erupted in a mini-civil war over whether the state would choose to define and 
enforce property rights in humans.   
In the Judiciary, the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford came to the Supreme Court and 
further increased tensions over the issue of property rights discrimination in slavery.  The 
Court ruled that “Dred Scott was not a citizen and had no right to sue in federal courts” for 
his freedom (Nash and Jeffrey 2001, 451).  The ruling also stated that Congress could not ban 
slavery in a territory and that even though the Scotts had been taken by their masters on 
sojourn to free states, their status as slaves was unaffected.  This federal ruling further 
defined and enforced slave-owner rights, which contradicted the laws of the free states.   
The final nail in the coffin was the election of the free soil, anti- slavery Republican 
Abraham Lincoln in 1860.  The Lincoln election demonstrated how politically divided the 
United States had become over the complicated issues presented by the controversy over 
slave-owner and human rights.  Lincoln did not win a single slave state, but he did not need 
to.  He won 40% of the national vote and decisively in the North (Nash and Jeffrey 2001, 
455). 
Within three months of his election, the slave states began seceding.  In the first 
round, South Carolina seceded in December 1861, then Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas between January 9-February 1.  These were the Lower South 
states.  South Carolina’s convention vote for secession was in favor 169-0, while the rest of 
the first round of secession votes went in favor at an average of 80% of the vote (McPherson 
1988, 235).  The second round of state secessions, which occurred after the attack on Fort 
Sumter in April 1861, consisted of Virginia first, then Arkansas, Tennessee, and North 
Carolina.  The Border States of Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland did not secede.  The 
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Lower South secession conventions were highly represented by slaveholders.  Not one 
secession convention, which led to secession, consisted of a lower percentage of slaveholder 
delegates than 61% (Wooster 1962).   
TABLE 4 - Percent of Slave-owning Secession Convention Delegates, 1860-1861 
Secessionary States 
% of Secession 
Convention Delegates 
Who Owned Slaves in 
1860 
1st Secession   
  S. Carolina 90.5 
  Mississippi 85.0 
  Alabama 79.0 
  Florida 79.0 
  Georgia 86.0 
  Louisiana 82.0 
  Texas 71.8 
2nd Secession   
  Virginia 77.6 
  Arkansas 61.1 
  Tennessee 66.0 
  N. Carolina 82.0 
      
Source: Wooster, Ralph A. 1962. The Secession Conventions of the South. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
The reasoning given in the official declaration of causes by South Carolina, 
Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, and Georgia highlighted the sectional issue of slavery as a 
primary factor, as well. 
Slave-owners were a large group of individuals whose interests were tied to 
preserving the institution of slavery in the antebellum period of the United States.  While not 
all slave-owners desired disunion, controversies surrounding the issue of fugitive slave laws, 
the expansion of slave-owner property rights into the territories, and the election of an anti-
slave President proved too much for their expectations regarding slave ownership. 
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5.4 SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE 
It appears from the evidence based on the case of slavery in the antebellum period that 
property rights discrimination in fact may serve as a causal force in the onset of secessionary 
movements and civil war.   
Slave owners had a significant vested interest at stake in the question of property 
rights over humans.  The value of slaves in the South by the time of the Civil War was over 
$3 billion and represented the second largest valued asset in the nation, next to land.  Slaves 
were necessary to the continued production of cotton and were treated as assets that could be 
bought and sold in the market.   
The conflicts over slave-owner property rights arose in the early antebellum period 
regarding fugitive slaves and slaves that were brought by their masters into free territory.  
Free states struggled with protecting the rights of their own citizens while enforcing rights of 
slave owners.  While the free states adopted Personal Liberty Laws and allowed the use of 
common law legal procedures, such as habeas corpus and de homine replegiando, slave-
owners saw this as an infringement on their property rights, as it increased the costs of slave 
ownership. 
As the nation expanded westward, the conflict over slavery intensified at the national 
level.  While the question came to the Supreme Court over whether slave-owners who 
brought slaves into free territories would maintain their property rights in their slaves, the 
question of admitting free and slave states in the western territories raised the stakes even 
higher.  By the early 1850s, the sectional issue of slavery destroyed the Whig party, which 
had served as glue holding together both slave and free states based on nonsectional interests, 
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and gave birth to the Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln.  By the election of Lincoln in 
1860, slavery had become the primary platform issue.   
The election of Lincoln led to a secessionary movement in the South as Southerners 
believed him and the Republican Party to be against their interests.  The main slave states in 
the Deep South seceded with slavery being the primary reasoning behind their secession.  
Then the Middle South states followed in the second wave of secessions after Fort Sumter.  
Slave-owner interests were highly represented in the secession conventions of the 
secessionary states.  Over 90% of attendees to the South Carolina convention were slave-
owners, while the lowest of any of the secessionary states was 61.8%.   
While this narrative of the main events and problems that led to the American Civil 
War has been brief, it sheds light on just how divisive the discriminatory property rights 
regimes were.  While one regime valued human rights and did not consider human beings as 
legitimate objects for another’s ownership, in the other viewed property rights in humans as a 
norm to be protected.  This jurisdictionally bifurcated property rights regime created 
problems as the value of slaves rose and the nation sought expansion westward.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have submitted for examination the question of whether interjurisdictional 
property rights discrimination may serve as an impetus for civil war.  While not all cases of 
interjurisdictional property rights discrimination may lead to civil war, sometimes they do.   
In my theory I suggested that increased costs from interjurisdictional property rights 
discrimination affect the expectations of owners regarding the relative gains from their 
resource.  This may lead to discontent, which may lead to political action through the 
political institutions or outside of the political institutions to improve the cost function of 
ownership of the resource.  Political violence may result if the discontented see no other 
effective option to achieve their ends.  
In the case of the United States in the antebellum period, the increasing value of 
slaves to the southern economy, the personal liberty laws of free states, and questions over 
the continued expansion of two different regimes regarding ownership of slaves raised to a 
boiling point the political tensions of the nation. As prospects for the expansion of the slave 
regime looked dimmer with the election of Abraham Lincoln, discontent resulted in 
secession of the deep and middle South slave states.  Civil War erupted. 
Three specific points can be taken away from this paper: 
1. Ownership of property is subject to the costs of enforcing one’s ownership rights. 
Slave-owners faced increased costs of protection of their property rights whenever their 
slaves entered free states.  Because the free states presumed that its residents were free, they 
protected the civil liberties of their residents.  Legal procedures and Personal Liberty Laws 
challenged slave-owner property rights, thus increasing costs of ownership, which ultimately 
affected their expectations regarding the investment.   
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2. Interjurisdictional property rights discrimination creates winners and losers based on 
the effect of the specification and enforcement of the ownership rights on the costs 
and expectations of relative gains of those who own or purport to own the resource. 
3. Interjurisdictional property rights discrimination losers may be driven to political 
action outside of the institutions if the institutions appear to exclude them. 
Deep and Middle South slave-owning states seceded from the Union when they found that 
their interests would not be sufficiently represented after the election of Abraham Lincoln.  
With a President against the expansion of the slave-based property rights regime, national 
political power shifted in favor of free states. 
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CHAPTER 7: EPILOGUE AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
After conducting research for this paper, it became apparent late that I really had two papers 
to write.  One would be about interjurisdictional property rights discrimination, which could 
be generalizeable to interstate conflict over property rights.  That is mostly what is the 
resultant attempt in the paper here.  The other could be about intrajurisdictional property 
rights discrimination, which could be generalizeable to intrastate distributional conflicts, such 
as those over the expropriation of private property for state uses, or any set of various 
policies that are distributionally favorable to one group at the expense of another within a 
jurisdiction. Further elucidating the difference between inter- and intrajurisdictional property 
rights discrimination would be a good place to start for future research. 
 Future improvements to this paper could come from making some adjustments to: the 
approach to variable specification; theory development; a proper review of the literature 
related directly to the proposed theory and the question asked; and the choice of empirical 
evidence. 
I could make improvements to the independent and dependent variables by specifying 
the variables more precisely, which for starters would be aided by further improving the 
definitions of inter- and intrajurisdictional property rights discrimination.   
I could improve the literature review by focusing directly on interjurisdicitonal 
property rights discrimination from the start.  There is a large body of research on civil war 
causation and the role of property rights in economic growth that I would have liked to 
include.  This would help with my theory development in understanding the relationship 
between jurisdictional differences in property rights regimes and changes in costs and 
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expectations regarding ownership rights consequent of transjurisdictional movement of the 
resource or jurisdictional proximity. 
As for improving the empirical evidence, more could be done regarding explicit 
statement of the control variables.  A thorough historiographical review of the causes of the 
U.S. Civil War and taking account of control variables in the causes of the war would have 
buttressed the discussion of empirical evidence and the inferences that could be made from 
the evidence (.  Reviewing the greed and grievance literature on civil war causation would 
also help (Ballentine 2003, 2005, 2003; Bannon 2003; Berdal 1997, 2000; Blattman 2010; 
Brubaker 1998; Collier 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005; Fearon 1995, 2003; Gurr 1971; 
Johnson 2003; Jok 2001; Jung 2003; Kalyvas 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2006, 2007, 2011; Keen 
2000; Klare 2001; Richards 1996; Ross 2003, 2006; Safford 2002; Sambanis 2001, 2003, 
2004).    
Moreover, stronger inferences could have been made from the U.S. Civil War case 
with different evidence from the antebellum period that could more directly speak to the 
relationship of interjurisdictional property rights discrimination and civil war causation.  For 
one, I would have liked to show that changes in property rights discrimination at the national 
level affected slave prices, but I found the results to be spurious, possibly because of 
specification issues.  Further research would need to be done to look for correlation.  Another 
option would have been to look at how changes in the free states’ regime regarding slave 
ownership (e.g., personal liberty laws, abolitionist presence in different localities, etc.) 
affected slave values in the contiguous border areas of slave and free states.  Finding 
significant correlation in the relationship between changes in interjurisdictional property 
rights discrimination and the value of slaves would have provided direct evidence of the price 
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effect of discrimination.  Perhaps one of these two routes would provide a future avenue for 
research on the cause-effect relationship of interjurisdictional property rights discrimination 
and civil war. 
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